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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JESSE BROWN, by and
through his guardian
ad litem,
JEFFERY BROWN,
PlaintiffAppellant,

Case No. 870387

vs.
Category 14b
KEVIN K. LOH, JOSEPH
PLUTA, NORMAN LIWANAG,
EUGENE LONG, and THOMAS
M. FOLEY, dba THE KNIGHT
BLOCK PARTNERSHIP, a
Hawaii general partnership,
DefendantsRespondents,
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from the Judgment of the Fourth Judicial
District Court of Utah County, dated September 10, 1987, which
granted

the defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

This Court has

jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(i) (1987).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
May a plaintiff recover damages from a defendant when the
defendant has negligently inflicted severe emotional distress
upon the plaintiff?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. RULES. OR REGULATIONS
The plaintiff is unaware of any constitutional provision,
statute, rule, or regulation that is determinative of the issue
presented for review.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff filed this action against the defendants to
recover damages

for the

severe emotional

distress that was

negligently

inflicted upon the plaintiff's minor son by the

defendants.

Arguing that the plaintiff's complaint failed to

state a claim for which relief could be granted, the defendants
filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
which was granted on September 10, 1987.

The plaintiff filed

this appeal on October 13, 1987.
On Saturday, August 2, 1986, Jesse Brown1, then 10 years
old (R. 5 ) , and JoeDee2 Quinn entered the defendants' building,
the Knight Block Building, located at #1 East Center Street,
Provo, Utah, to ride the elevator.
elevator's

construction

position himself

makes

it

(R. 4, para. 4.)
possible

between the elevator's

for

a

inner door

child

The
to

and the

access door to watch the operation of the elevator while it

x

Jesse Brown is the minor son of Jeffery Brown, the
Appellant herein. Jeffery Brown has been duly appointed as the
guardian ad litem for Jesse with respect to this action. (R. 9.)
2

The complaint uses the spelling of "Jody." (R. 2.)
The
death certificate in the files of the plaintiff's attorneys,
however, reveals that the correct spelling is "JoeDee," and that
he was 13 years old at the time of his death.
2

ascends to another floor.3 (R. 2 para. 9.)

The defendants knew

information in the files of the plaintiff's attorneys
reveals that the elevator's outer door swings from the right
into the hallway. The elevator's inner door is made of vertical
tubes that are secured at the top, center, and bottom by a
series of brackets. The elevator services the basement floor,
the main floor, the first floor, and the second floor. When
located at the basement floor, the space between the outer and
inner doors is approximately seven inches wide, which narrows to
approximately three and one-half inches on the main floor.
The elevator is an old model, and is located in the Knight
Block Building, an old building in the center of Provo which was
renovated and converted into office space while still maintaining its rustic character. The elevator had last been inspected
nearly three and a half years before the accident. Children had
been frequently observed to play on the elevator without
supervision or control.
On August 2, 1986, Jesse and JoeDee had been riding the
elevator up and down for a period of approximately two hours,
and became curious about how the elevator operated. JoeDee
discovered that he could stand between the outer and inner doors
of the elevator and observe the elevator operate within the
elevator shaft. After placing himself between the doors, JoeDee
instructed Jesse, who was still located inside the elevator, to
press the main floor button, thereby causing the elevator to
rise. As the elevator rose to the main floor, the seven inch
space narrowed to three and one-half inches, wedging JoeDee's
body between the elevator shaft wall and the elevator, which
crushed his legs and waist.
As the elevator began to crush him, • JoeDee cried out in
pain to Jesse, who was frantically pressing the emergency stop
button. Unfortunately, the button did not work and the elevator
continued to rise while Jesse looked on in horror and shock.
Finally, the force exerted by the wedging of JoeDee's body
caused a fuse to blow and the elevator stopped.
Jesse immediately cried out for help and tried to speak with JoeDee, who
was then only able to whisper. Within two minutes, JoeDee was
silent; shortly thereafter, JoeDee was dead.
It was at least fifteen minutes before anyway responded to
Jesse's frantic cries for help. During that time, Jesse was
trapped inside the elevator cage. Jesse talked to JoeDee for
the few minutes until he became silent, and could reach down and
touch him, but was powerless to help.
Emergency workers
eventually arrived and began the laborious process of rescuing
Jesse and freeing JoeDee's body.
Jesse observed most of the
rescue efforts.
He continues to suffer from sleeplessness,
nightmares, an abnormal refusal to associate with friends, fear
and anguish associated with elevators which causes him to relive
the ordeal, and other problems related to the trauma he experienced.
3

or should have known that children might engage in such activity
to

satisfy

their

curiosity

regarding

the

operation

of

the

elevator, and that children would thereby be exposed to risk of
serious injury or death. (R. 3. para. 10.)
JoeDee placed himself between the doors of the elevator
while Jesse operated the controls to move the elevator to the
next floor.

JoeDee became wedged between the elevator's inner

door and the wall of the elevator shaft, and was crushed to
death. (R. 3 para. 11.)
Jesse
between

rode

the

elevator

the elevator's

with

JoeDee,

doors, witnessed

observed the unsuccessful rescue efforts.

observed

JoeDee's

JoeDee

death, and

All of this served to

injure and traumatize him and to cause severe emotional distress
and damage.

Jesse continued to suffer from having witnessed the

traumatic and gruesome death of his best fr.iend—that is, Jesse
suffered

from the emotional trauma that was

induced by the

severe psychological and mental distress occasioned by JoeDee's
death.

(R. 3 para. 13.)

The plaintiff filed this action to recover damages from the
defendants for the emotional distress that was inflicted upon
Jesse as a result of the defendants' negligent maintenance of,
and supervision over, the elevator.

(R. 3 para. 12.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The issue of whether Utah recognizes a cause of action for
negligently inflicted emotional injury has never been directly
addressed and analyzed by this Court.
4

The trial court granted

the defendants1 Motion to Dismiss based on the assertion in
Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982), that Utah does not
recognize such a cause of action.

That statement was not,

however, necessary to the holding in Reiser, and was in turn
based on dicta from two earlier Utah cases.
To the extent that prior decisions of this Court do deny
any redress for negligently inflicted emotional injury, those
decisions should be overruled.

Every other state in the nation

recognizes a cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional
injury.
injury

The cases generally arise in the context of emotional
incurred by witnessing

severe

injury to or death of

another person, and can be grouped under three main categories.
Six states follow the Impact Rule, and allow recovery only if
the plaintiff

suffered

a physical impact

quences from the emotional injury.

or physical conse-

Nine states allow bystander

recovery only for plaintiffs who were in the same zone of danger
as the person physically

injured.

The growing majority of

states, 34 to date, apply the same rule as used in other areas
of tort law, and allow recovery for foreseeable injuries.
The

Impact

and

Zone

of

Danger

Rules

are

grounded

in

antiquated notions of the difficulty of proving or defending
against emotional injuries and on an unfounded fear of a flood
of litigation.

Only the Foreseeability Rule can be logically

supported in light of modern abilities to analyze and measure
emotional injuries, and in view of the duty of courts to grant
all injured parties equal rights of redress.
5

This Court should

join the majority and better-reasoned decisions and adopt the
Foreseeability Rule.
ARGUMENT
UTAH SHOULD ADOPT THE FORESEEABILITY RULE OF RECOVERY
FOR NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED EMOTIONAL INJURY.
I.

Historical Background

Seventy-two years ago, this Court recognized a cause of
action for intentionally inflicted emotional distress in Jeppsen
v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 P. 429 (1916) .

In obiter dictum,

however, this Court went on to state that a cause of action for
negligently
recognized:

inflicted

emotional

distress

was

,f

[M]ental suffering, unaccompanied

not
by

generally
injury to

purse or person, affords no basis for an action predicated upon
wrongful acts, merely negligent . . . . M

Id. at 540, 155 P. at

43 0 (citation omitted).
This

dictum

Century's

posture

correctly
toward

characterized

claims

for

the

psychic

Nineteenth-

injury.

posture developed simultaneously in England and America.

This
In

Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222
(1888), and in Lehman v. Brooklyn City Railroad, 47 Hun. 355, 14
St. R. 575 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1888), it was held that damages could
not be recovered for negligently inflicted emotional distress
unaccompanied by physical injury as such was without precedent.
Scotland rejected the Coultas decision in Gillicran v. Robb,
Sess. Cas. 856 (1910), holding that damages could be recovered
for negligently inflicted nervous shock even in the absence of
6

physical

impact.

Although

Ireland

cause of action for negligently

had

already

recognized a

inflicted emotional distress

without impact in Byrne v, Great Southern & Western Railway of
Ireland,

(unreported),

decision

in

Bell

it

v, Great

L.R. Ir. 428 (1890) .

Northern

repudiated
Railway

the

of

Coultas

Ireland,

26

See Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34

Harv. L. Rev. 260 (1920-21).
the Coultas decision

explicitly

England itself finally abandoned

in Dulieu v. White

& Sons, 2 K.B. 669

(1901), and held that a person could recover for negligently
inflicted nervous shock without physical impact.
In America, however, the holding in Lehman, which denied
recovery for psychic injury without physical impact, "became the
weight

of

American

authority

of

the

late

1890's."

National Bank v. Langley, 314 So. 2d 324, 329
This

authority

was

the

rationale

that

First

(Miss. 1975).

underlay

the

dictum

announced by this Court in Jeppsen and has been embodied in a
rule that has come to be known as the Impact Rule.
II.

The Impact Rule

The Impact Rule "provides that only a person who suffers an
impact from the same force which injures a third person may
recover for emotional distress due to witnessing the injury to
the third person."
P.2d

Saechao v. Matsakoun, 78 Or. App. 3 40, 717

165, 167, review dismissed,

(1986) .

302 Or. 155, 727 P.2d 126

The rule was fashioned out of a belief that psychic

injury claims are too "easily . . . fabricated:

or as sometimes

stated, are easy to assert and hard to defend against."
7

Samms

V, Eccles,

11 Utah

2d

289,

291,

358

P.2d

344,

345

(1961).

"[Cjourts generally have not focused on considerations such as
whether

people

well-being.

have

Rather,

some
courts

original
have

entitlement

articulated

to

psychic

concerns

about

unlimited liability, false claims, a flood of trivial lawsuits,
uncertainty
tiffs."

of damages

and windfall

Bell, The Bell Tolls;

compensation

for plain-

Toward Full Tort Recovery For

Psychic Injury. 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. 333, 347 (1984).

The Impact

Rule is therefore viewed as a physically reliable guarantee of
psychic injury.
The cold injustice worked by the Impact Rule can be seen in
Saechao, wherein the defendant, while attempting to park her
car, backed over a curb, crushing and killing a two-year old
child, Ou Fou Saechao.

Ou Fou's brother attempted to pull him

from the car's path, but was struck by the car and knocked away
from Ou Fou.

Also present at a distance of approximately 15

feet were Ou Fou's sister and another brother.
Suit was brought on behalf of the three children for the
extreme emotional trauma, physical trauma, nausea, nightmares,
and headaches they sustained as a result of the defendant's
negligence.

Based on the Impact Rule, the trial court granted

the defendant's motion to dismiss as to the sister and brother
who witnessed Ou Fou's death from a distance of less than 15
feet, while it denied the motion as to the brother who was
struck by the car as he attempted to pull Ou Fou from the car's
path.
8

Reasoning that the defendant breached no duty to Ou Fou's
onlooking sister and brother, the court of appeals affirmed,
stating

that

the

Impact

Rule

"creates

a clear

relationship

between compensability and the plaintiff's being a victim of a
breach of duty."

717 P.2d at 169.

Only the brother who was

physically impacted by the defendant's negligence was permitted
to recover for his psychic injury, despite the fact that his
injuries were concededly identical to his bystanding sister and
brother.
The Impact Rule thus denies recovery for psychic injuries
without physical impact on the ground that there is no duty of
due care.

The Impact Rule is premised on a belief that "the

imposition of duty here would work disaster because it would
invite fraudulent claims and it would involve the courts in the
hopeless

task

liability."

of

defining

the

extent

of

the

tortfeasor's

Dillon v. Legq, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72,

441 P.2d 912, 914 (Cal. 1968).
This

rationale

erroneously

assumes

that

liability

is

impossible to define and that denying a duty of due care is "the
only realistic

alternative."

Id.

It

"assumes that juries,

confronted by irreconcilable expert medical testimony, will be
unable to distinguish the deceitful from the bona fide," and
that "only a per se rule denying the entire class of claims that
potentially raises this administrative problem can avoid this
danger."

Id. at 917.

9

As the court in Dillon noted, however:

"[T]he possibility

that fraudulent assertions may prompt recovery in isolated cases
does not justify a wholesale rejection of the entire class of
claims in which that potentiality arises."

Id. at 917-18.

possibility

detection

that

some

fraud will

escape

"The

does not

justify an abdication of the judicial responsibility to award
damages for sound claims . . . ."

Id. at 918.

In the words of

the Supreme Court of Connecticut:

"Certainly it is a very ques-

tionable position for a court to take, that because of the
possibility of encouraging fictitious claims compensation should
be

denied

those who

have

actually

through the negligence of another."

suffered

serious

injury

Orlo v. Connecticut Co.,

128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402, 405 (1941).

This Court has also

stated the same principle:
It is further to be observed that the argument
against allowing such an action because groundless
charges may be made is not a good reason for denying
recovery. If the right to recover for injury resulting from the wrongful conduct could be defeated whenever such dangers exist, many of the grievances the
law deals with would be eliminated. That some claims
may be spurious should not compel those who administer
justice to shut their eyes to serious wrongs and let
them go without being brought to account. It is the
function of courts and juries to determine whether
claims are valid or false. This responsibility should
not be shunned merely because the task may be difficult to perform.
Samms, 358 P.2d at 347.
In the wake of such reasoning, followers of the Impact Rule
have fallen away.

"[T]he great majority of courts have now

repudiated the requirement of ' i m p a c t ' . . . . "

Prosser and

Keeton on the Law of Torts (hereinafter Law of Torts) § 54 at
10

364 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).

For a list of the states that

have abolished the Impact Rule, see Gates v, Richardson, 719
P.2d 193, 195 n.l (Wyo. 1986).
Moreover, scholars have pointed out that denying liability
for psychic injuries unaccompanied by physical impact on the
ground that there is no duty of due care begs the ultimate
question—whether an individual's interest in psychic well-being
is entitled to legal protection.

Common sense alone belies the

notion that psychological stability and mental tranquility are
trivial and dispensable.

"Psychic well-being is the core of

what is important to human existence and is too important to the
individual

to

surrender."

36

U. Fla. L. Rev.

at

342.

"[F]reedom from mental distress is an interest that is today
worthy of legal protection."

Corso v. Merrill. 119 N.H. 647,

406 A.2d 300, 304 (1979).
In our increasingly complex society, the orderly
and normal functioning of a man's mind is as critical
to his well-being as physical health. Indeed, a sound
mind within a disabled body can accomplish much, while
a disabled mind in the soundest of bodies is rarely
capable of making any substantial contribution to
society.
Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress;

The Case for an

Independent Tort. 59 Geo. L.J. 1237 (1970-71).
With

respect

to

duty,

Professor

Prosser

observed that duty is merely a legal conclusion:

has

correctly

"'[D]uty! is

not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum
total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to
say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection."
11

Law of Torts

§ 53, at 358.

These policy considerations played a critical

role in the development of the concept of duty.
of

'overriding

risk

[is]

of

policy

. . . primary

element of duty.1"
v. Mollica,
(1965)).

considerations

231

"In the absence

. . . foreseeability

importance

in

establishing

of
the

Dillon, 441 P.2d at 919, (quoting Grafton

Cal. App.

2d

860,

42

Cal. Rptr. 306,

310

It has long been accepted that M[t]he risk reasonably

to be perceived

defines the duty

to be

obeyed.11

Palsaraf

v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 100
(N.Y. 1928).
Most

courts

today

have

abandoned

the

Impact

Rule

and

adopted the notion of foreseeability as the touchstone of duty.
This approach is known as the Foreseeability Rule; it permits a
person to recover damages for negligently inflicted emotional
distress without impact if the damages sustained were reasonably
foreseeable.

The physical impact requirement has come to be

chastised as an artificial barrier with no place in Twentieth
Century jurisprudence.4
Today, only the following six jurisdictions still adhere to
the Impact Rule:
291

Ark. 304,

Arkansas:
724

S.W.2d

Midwest Buslines, Inc. v. Johnson,
453

4

(1987);

Georgia:

Hamilton

The artificial nature of the barrier is demonstrated by
the extent to which courts will strain to find an "impact." The
Supreme Court of South Dakota, for example, while not deciding
which rule it would follow, recently held that even under the
Impact Rule, recovery would be allowed for emotional injury
where the only physical "impact" was nausea and diarrhea.
Wright v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Central South Dakota, Inc.,
414 N.W.2d 608 (S.D. 1987).
12

v, Powell. Goldstein. Frazer & Murphy. 252 Ga. 149, 311 S.E.2d
818 (Ga. 1984); Indiana:

Boston v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway

Co. . 223 Ind. 425, 61 N.E. 2d 326
v. Shein.

597

S.W.2d

141

(1945); Kentucky:

Deutsch

Oregon5:

(Ky. 1980);

Saechao

v. Matsakoun. 78 Or. App. 340, 717 P.2d 165, review dismissed.
302 Or. 155, 727 P.2d 126 (1986); and Washington, D.C.:

Waldon

v. Covington. 415 A.2d 1070 (D.C. App. 1980).
The Oregon Supreme Court, however, has stated that it has
"not had occasion to examine the bystander's claim for psychic
injury from witnessing a negligent physical injury to a close
relative . . . and we therefore exclude it from the pertinent
analogues in Oregon."

Norwest v. Presbyterian

Intercommunity

Hospital. 293 Or. 543, 652 P.2d 318, 327 n.18 (1982).

Likewise,

the Washington, D . C , Court of Appeals has indicated that it, en
banc, could

overrule the

Impact

Rule.

Asuncion v. Columbia

Hospital for Women. 514 A.2d 1187 (D.C. App. 1986).
III.
Some

courts

that

The Zone of Danger Rule
have

abandoned

the

Impact

Rule

have

stopped short of the Foreseeability Rule by adopting the Zone of
Danger Rule, which permits a person to recover damages for
negligently inflicted emotional distress without impact if the
person was within the zone of physical danger when the psychic
5

It should be observed, however, that Oregon has created an
exception to the Impact Rule, which permits a plaintiff to
recover damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress
unaccompanied by physical impact when the plaintiff is the
direct victim of the defendant's tortious conduct.
Harris v.
Kisslina. 721 P.2d 838, 840 (Or. App. 1986).
13

injury occurred.

Courts adopting the Foreseeability Rule have

correctly noted that the Zone of Danger Rule is simply another
artificial barrier, which, like the Impact Rule, has no place in
today's society.
The unwarranted injustice worked by the Zone of Danger Rule
can be seen in Dillon, wherein the defendant negligently drove
his car into Erin Dillon as she crossed Clover Lane, thereby
causing her death.

Erin's sister was standing on the curb, and

her mother a few yards back, when the defendant's car struck
Erin.

Both sustained extreme emotional shock and injury.

The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment as to the mother, dismissing her claim for psychic
injury on the ground that she was not personally within the zone
of physical danger, but denied the motion as to Erin's sister.
The

California

result:

Supreme

Court

was

"[W]e can hardly justify

repulsed

by

this

bizarre

relief to the sister for

trauma which she suffered upon apprehension of [Erin's] death
and yet deny it to the mother merely because of a happenstance
that the sister was some few yards closer to the accident."
P.2d at 915.

441

The court went on to reject the Zone of Danger

Rule.
The Zone of Danger Rule has been critically analyzed by the
Massachusetts Supreme Court:
The problem with the zone of danger rule . . . is that
it is an inadequate measure of the reasonable foreseeability of the possibility of physical injury resulting from a parent's anxiety arising from harm to his
child.
The reasonable foreseeability of such a
physical injury to a parent does not turn on whether
14

the parent was or was not a reasonable prospect for a
contemporaneous injury because of the defendant's
negligent conduct. Although the zone of danger rule
tends to produce more reasonable results than the
[impact] rule and provides a means of limiting the
scope of a defendant's liability, it lacks strong
logical support.
Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1300
(1978).
In place of the Zone of Danger Rule, the California Supreme
Court adopted the Foreseeability Rule.

The Dillon

decision has

come to be viewed as the seminal decision in this area of the
law;

it

has

served

as

the

guiding

decision

for

the

near-universal adoption of the Foreseeability Rule in contemporary America.
Today, only the following nine jurisdictions still adhere
to the Zone of Danger Rule:

Arizona:

Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979);

Keck v. Jackson, 122

Colorado:

Towns v. Anderson,

195 Colo. 517, 579 P.2d 1163 (1978); Delaware:

Robb v. Pennsyl-

vania Railroad Co., 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709 (1965); Illinois:
Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 98 111. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d
1

(1983);

Minnesota:

Stadler

(Minn. 1980); New York:

Pipe

(Tenn. 1978); Vermont:

N.W.2d

(1984); North Dakota:

v. Bismarck Hospital, 197 N.W.2d
v. Russell

295

552

Bovsun v. Sanoeri. 61 N.Y.2d 219, 473

N.Y.S.2d 357, 461 N.E.2d 843

Shelton

v. Cross,

&

678

Foundry

Whetham

(N.D. 1972); Tennessee:
Co. ,

570

S.W.2d

861

Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hospital

of Vermont, Inc., 139 Ut. 138, 425 A.2d 92 (1980).

15

Although Wisconsin follows the Zone of Danger Rule, it has
created an exception under the Foreseeability Rule for plaintiffs within the scope of the defendant's tortious activity even
though unendangered.

Garrett v. City of New Berlin, 122 Wis. 2d

223, 362 N.W.2d 137 (1985).
IV.

The Foreseeability Rule

Today, the Foreseeability Rule is the majority approach for
compensating claimants for psychic injury.

This rule has been

adopted by most of the jurisdictions that have considered the
issue

presented

by

this

appeal.

The

Foreseeability

Rule

requires courts to focus upon certain factors on a case-by-case
basis to determine whether the plaintiff was emotionally traumatized by the defendant's negligent conduct.
Dillon court:

"The evaluation of these factors will indicate

the degree of the defendant's
92 0.

In the words of the

foreseeability."

441 P. 2d at

The Dillon court identified three factors to be considered

when applying the Foreseeability Rule:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of
the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance
away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a
direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the
sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from
others after its occurrence.
(3) Whether plaintiff
and the victim were closely related, as contrasted
with an absence of any relationship or the presence of
only a distant relationship.
Id.
The above-described factors are not mandatory requirements,
but meaningful indicators to be considered when determining the
16

foreseeable results of a defendant's negligent conduct. In the
words of the Ohio Supreme Court:
Concomitant with this test of foreseeability, we
add several factors which should be considered in
order to determine the reasonable foreseeability of a
negligently inflicted emotional injury to a plaintiffbystander. These factors are by no means exclusive,
and the mere failure of a plaintiff to satisfy all of
them should not preclude an aggrieved party from
recovery. Thus, the term "factors" should be underscored to alleviate any misconception that such
factors are requirements.
The purpose of these
factors is to assist and guide the determination of
whether the serious emotional injury was1 reasonably
foreseeable to the defendant at the time the accident
(which precipitated the cause of action) took place.
Pauah v. Hanks. 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759, 766 (1983).
With respect to the first factor, the New Jersey Supreme
Court has made the following observation:
Discovering the death or serious injury of an
intimate family member will always be expected to
threaten
one's
emotional
welfare.
Ordinarily,
however, only a witness at the scene of the accident
causing death or serious injury will suffer a traumatic sense of loss that may destroy his sense of
security and cause severe emotional distress.
Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521, 527 (1980) (emphasis
added).
The Wyoming Supreme Court has acknowledged that this factor
properly limits the class of plaintiffs:
The essence of the tort is the shock caused by
the perception of an especially horrendous event. It
is more than the shock one suffers when he learns of
the death or injury of a child, sibling or parent over
the phone, from a witness, or at the hospital. It is
more than bad news. The kind of shock the tort
requires is the result of the immediate aftermath of
an accident.
Gates, 719 P.2d at 199 (citations omitted).
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With respect to the second

factor, the Wyoming

Supreme

Court has observed the following:
As an assurance of genuine shock, the courts that have
adopted the tort have generally agreed that the person
claiming emotional harm must witness a serious
accident or its aftermath. The primary victim must,
in fact, be seriously injured or killed and the
claimant must realize, at the time he witnesses the
event, that the injuries are serious.
Id.
The Ohio Supreme Court has added the following variation to
this factor:
As far as the second factor is concerned, we believe
that it is not necessary for a plaintiff to actually
see the accident. Thus, for example, a contemporaneous observance of the accident through the sense of
hearing will enhance the likelihood that the emotional
injury was reasonably foreseeable.
Paugh, 451 N.E.2d at 766.
The Ohio Supreme Court has perfected the third factor by
implementing the following refinement:
With respect to the third factor, we believe that a
strict blood relationship between the accident victim
and
the plaintiff-bystander
is not
necessarily
required.
Id. at 766-67.
The Hawaii Supreme Court follows this rationale:
It is well established, in this jurisdiction,
that one has a duty to refrain (duty of care) from the
negligent infliction of serious emotional distress
upon another. This court has further concluded that
in connection with such a duty, relief for the
plaintiff exists regardless of the absence of physical
impact and resulting physical injury on the plaintiff
and the absence of blood relationship between the
victim and plaintiff.

18

Kelley v, Kokua Sales and Supply, Ltd,f 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d
673, 675 (Hawaii 1975) (citations omitted).
By combining these three factors, the Wyoming Supreme
Court has observed that the class of plaintiffs is properly
limited to those truly meritorious claimants.
A timely example is the space shuttle disaster. If
every person who witnessed that catastrophic event and
suffered mental harm could recover, the courts would
be overwhelmed and such projects as the space shuttle
would be laden with insuperable risk. As a society,
we must tell most of those who observed the disaster
and may have suffered because of it, that it is
suffering that is not compensable.
In this we
recognize that part of living involves some unhappy
and disagreeable emotions with which we must cope
without recovery of damages.
Gates, 719 P.2d at 198.
Thus, the Foreseeability Rule employs the traditional and
time-honored

approach announced

in Palsaraf that

lf

[t]he risk

reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.11
N.E. at 100.
risk

[is]

of

162

This approach anticipates that "foreseeability of
. . . primary

element of duty."

importance

in

establishing

Grafton, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 310.

the

By carefully

analyzing and applying the above-described factors, the Foreseeability Rule reliably and predictably indicates the reasonably
foreseeable results of a defendant's negligent conduct.
The persuasive justice worked by the Foreseeability Rule
thus framed can be seen in Portee, wherein two children were
riding an elevator, one of whom was the plaintiff's seven-year-old son, Guy Portee.

Like the facts in this action, Guy noted

that he could place himself between the outer and inner doors of

19

the elevator.
Guy was

After so doing, the elevator was activated and

dragged

upward

between

the

elevator

shaft

and

the

elevator.
The other child was located outside the elevator and raced
up a nearby stairway to meet the elevator on the next floor.
Upon opening the door, he saw the crushed body of Guy.
mother

arrived

immediately

thereafter

and witnessed

Guy's

the ex-

cruciating pain suffered by Guy, who flailed his arms and moaned
for help.

Rescue efforts were unsuccessful and Guy died while

the plaintiff helplessly looked on.

The plaintiff thereafter

suffered severe depression and extreme psychological trauma as a
result of the horrifying episode.

The plaintiff brought suit

for, among other claims, the severe emotional distress that she
"suffered as a result of the defendant's negligence.
Because the plaintiff was not personally within the zone of
danger,

the

trial

summary judgment.

court

granted

the defendant's

motion

for

The New Jersey Supreme Court abandoned the

Zone of Danger Rule, adopting instead the Foreseeability Rule
and stating:
Our inquiry has led us to conclude that the interest
in personal emotional stability is worthy of legal
protection against unreasonable conduct. The emotional harm following the perception of the death or
serious injury to a loved one is just as foreseeable
as the injury itself, for few persons travel through
life alone.
Ultimately we must decide whether
protecting these emotional interests outweighs an
interest against burdening freedom of conduct by
imposing a new species of negligence liability. We
believe that the interest in emotional stability we
have described is sufficiently important to warrant
this protection.
20

Portee, 417 A.2d at 528.
The Foreseeability Rule thus achieves a predictable outcome
and a just result.

Historically, the concept of foreseeability

has been utilized in every field of tort law except the field of
negligently inflicted emotional distress, which has, unfortunately, been subjected, and continues to be subjected, to such
artificial barriers as the Impact Rule and the Zone of Danger
Rule.

The Foreseeability Rule remedies this flaw by requiring a

complete analysis of the circumstances presented by each case to
determine whether the plaintiff's psychic injury was a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant's negligence.
Today,

the

Foreseeability

Rule

is

followed

remaining jurisdiction, thirty-four in all:

Alabama:

v. Baptist Medical Center, Inc.. 400 So. 2d 369
Alaska:

in

every
Taylor

(Ala. 1981);

Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkian, 727 P.2d 1038

(Alaska 1986); California:

Dillon v. Legq, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69

Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912

(1968); Connecticut:

Montinieri

v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 175 Conn. 337, 398 A.2d
1180

(1978) ;

Florida:

(Fla. 1985); Idaho:

Champion

v. Gray,

So. 2d

17

Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 100

Idaho 840, 606 P.2d 944 (1980); Iowa:
N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981); Hawaii:
Ltd. , 56 Hawaii

478

204, 532

Barnhill v. Davis, 300

Kellev v. Kokua Sales & Supply

P.2d

673

(1975);

Kansas:

Hoard

v. Shawnee Mission Medical Center, 233 Kan. 267, 662 P.2d 1214
(1983); Louisiana:

Todd v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 219

So. 2d 538 (La. 1969); Mesa v. Burke, 506 So. 2d 121 (La. App.),
21

cert, denied, 506 So.2d 1226 (La. 1987); Maine:
nett, 514 A.2d 802 (Me. 1986); Maryland:
Md. 490,

408

A.2d

728

(1979);

Rowe v. Ben-

Vance v. Vance, 286

Massachusetts:

Dziokonski

v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978); Michigan:
v. Sisters

of

Mercy

Health

App. 1986) ; Mississippi:

(Mont. 1983);

Nevada:

New

James

v. Lieb,

Selsnick

Jersey:

(N.J. 1980); New Mexico:

375

v. Horton,

Portee

N.W.2d

109

P.2d

1256

620

v. Jaffee.

417

A.2d

521

Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538,

S.E.2d 505 (N.C. App. 1987); Ohio:
(Ohio 1983); Oklahoma:

Ledford v. Martin, 359

Pauah v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d

Ellington v. Coca Cola Bottling

Co. of Tulsa, Inc., 717 P.2d

109

(Okla. 1982); Pennsylvania:

Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979); Rhode Island:
v. United

(Mich

Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300

673 P.2d 822 (1983); North Carolina:

759

732

Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765

(Nev. 1980); New Hampshire:
(N.H. 1979);

N.W.2d

Versland v. Caron Transport, 671 P.2d 583

Nebraska:

(Neb. 1985);

385

First National Bank v. Langley, 314

So. 2d 324 (1975); Missouri:
(Mo. 1983); Montana:

Corp.,

Warcrelin

States, 338 A.2d

524

(R.I. 1975);

DfAmbra

South Carolina:

Kinard v. Augusta Sash & Door Co. , 336 S.E.2d 465 (S.C. 1985);
South Dakota:6

Wright v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Central

South Dakota, Inc., 414 N.W.2d 608 (S.D. 1987); Texas:

6

St. Eli-

South Dakota has not directly addressed the question of
whether it would recognize a cause of action for negligently
inflicted emotional injury where there are no physical symptoms.
It appears from the cited case, however, that South Dakota would
adopt the foreseeability rule if the issue were directly
presented.
22

zabeth Hospital v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649
ginia:

(Tex. 1987); Vir-

Hughes v. Moore, 197 S.E.2d 214 (Va. 1973); Washington:

Hunslev v. Girard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976); West
Virginia:

Harless v. First

National

S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982); and Wyoming:

Bank

in Fairmont,

289

Gates v. Richardson, 719

P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986).
V.

Negligently Inflicted Emotional Injury in Utah

With the possible exception of Utah, therefore, every state
in the nation, as well as the District of Columbia, recognizes a
cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional distress.
The rule employed by each state has been heretofore identified.
With respect to Utah, however, it is unclear whether such a
cause of action even exists.

The dictum in Jeppsen indicated

that a person could recover damages for negligently inflicted
emotional distress if accompanied by "injury to purse or person.11

47 Utah at 540, 155 P. at 430.

This would seem to imply

that Utah adheres, or would have adhered, to the Impact Rule.
This dictum next appeared forty-five years later in Samms
v. Eccles. 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344

(1961), which, like

Jeppsen, involved a claim for intentionally inflicted emotional
distress.

In Samms, this dictum was reiterated when this Court

stated, again in obiter dictum, that a cause of action "may not
be based upon mere negligence."

Id. at 293, 358 P.2d at 346.

Twenty-one years later, this twice-repeated dictum served
as the underlying rationale for Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93
(Utah 1982), which, unlike Jeppsen and Samms, did involved a
23

claim for negligently inflicted emotional distress.

In Reiser,

this Court relied upon Samms and summarily held that, in Utah,
"a cause of action for emotional distress may not be based upon
mere negligence."

Id. at 100.

This statement, like those in

Jeppsen and Samms, was obiter dictum, for this Court had already
held that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of
limitations.

Nevertheless, this statement served as the basis

upon which the trial court granted the defendants' Motion to
Dismiss in this action.
In plain terms, the Reiser holding eliminated the right to
recover damages for negligently

inflicted

emotional distress

even if accompanied by physical impact, which is an even more
draconian approach than that announced in Jeppsen.7

It would

thus appear that Utah has retreated from, although it never
adopted,

the

antiquated

Impact

Rule

articulated

in

dictum

seventy-two years ago, thereby making it the only jurisdiction
in America that does not recognize a cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional distress.
The problem lies in the fact that this Court has never
directly addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff may recover
damages

for

negligently

inflicted

emotional

distress.

The

dictum announced in Jeppsen and reiterated in Samms has never
been

questioned,

analyzed,

or

studied.

7

Today,

it

stands

In Oregon, for example, the Impact Rule would still have
allowed the plaintiff in Reiser to recover because she was the
direct victim of the defendant's tortious activity even though
not physically impacted by the defendant's conduct. Harris, 721
P.2d at 840.
24

abandoned though never accepted; and in its place, an even more
anachronistic rule has emerged in Reiser.

The mere passing of

time, however, should not overshadow the fact that this dictum
is, and was, dictum:
Dictum thrice repeated is still
court's statement on a question
involved in the case and, hence, is
adjudication. It is not controlling

dictum. It is a
not necessarily
without force of
as precedent.

Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 638 P.2d 1324, 1327
(1981) (citations omitted).
Jeppsen, Samms, and Reiser simply perpetuate a Nineteenth
Century notion that has been uniformly rejected on two continents.

The Impact Rule has been rejected by both of the courts

that originally articulated

it.

This Court should therefore

utilize the opportunity presented by this appeal to carefully
question,
cumstances

thoughtfully

study,

under which

and directly

a plaintiff

may

address the cir-

recover damages

negligently inflicted emotional distress in Utah.
this Court

should

adopt

the

superior

embodied in the Foreseeability Rule.

In so doing,

and majority

approach

In the words of the Ohio

Supreme Court:
Today, this court has the unique opportunity to
establish standards in this ever evolving area of tort
law. To our credit, we need not experience the slow,
cynical recognition of an individual•s right to
emotional tranquillity; other jurisdictions have both
the experiences and illustrations which aid us in
adopting a course which brings our law securely in
step with the modern advances made in medical and
psychiatric science. While some may view our decision
today as an unsettling quantum leap into this difficult area of the law, the situation is one of
paramount necessity in fitting the law to the dynamics
and nuances of modern twentieth century society. We
25

for

view our decision today as a bold and promising step
in ensuring an individual's right to emotional
tranquillity which is redressable in an action against
a blameworthy defendant for the negligent infliction
of serious emotional distress.
Paugh, 451 N.E.2d at 762-63.
VI.

Objections to Recovery

Historically, five arguments have been raised as grounds
for

denying

recovery

of

damages

for

negligently

inflicted

emotional distress:
They are [1] medical science's supposed difficulty in
proving causation between the claimed damages and the
alleged fright, [2] the fear of fraudulent or exaggerated claims, [3] the concern that to allow such a
recovery will precipitate a veritable flood of litigation, [4] the problem of unlimited and unduly burdensome liability, and [5] the difficulty of reasonably
circumscribing the area of liability.
Sinn, 404 A.2d at 678 (numbering added).
Each argument will be addressed hereafter8 despite the fact
that, in the words of Professor Prosser,

fl

[a]ll these objections

have been answered many times, and it is threshing old straw to
deal with them."

Law of Torts § 54, at 360.

a. Medical science is able to supply a causal link between the
psychic damage suffered by the bystander and the shock or fright
attendant to having witnessed the accident.
Even before the tort of negligently

inflicted

emotional

distress was recognized, it was "assumed that medical science
[was] unable to establish that the alleged psychic injuries in
fact resulted from seeing a gruesome accident."
8

Sinnf 404 A.2d

The subheadings used hereafter have been taken verbatim
from Sinn.
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at 678.

Professor Leibson has pointed out that this assumption

fl

was certainly a product of its time" and stated:
It was a time when medical science, especially that
branch concerned with the study of emotions, was in
its infancy. The courts regarded with suspicion complainants who experienced no physical injuries but who
maintained they suffered grievous emotional damage.
At that time, there was no assurance that psychiatric
study had become sophisticated enough to satisfactorily establish a cause and effect relationship
between the injury and the incident which allegedly
gave rise to it. Indeed, courts were reluctant even
to recognize the existence of damages in such a case
because, at that time, there was no universal acceptance of the fact that emotional problems could be
triggered by a single event and that, with care and
treatment, they could be cured. The medical profession itself gave such an idea little thought. For a
long time, insanity and other emotional illnesses were
considered to be the result of one's owns sins.

Leibson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by
Physical Iniury to Another, 15 J. Family L. 163, 163-64 (197677) .
Modern advances in psychiatry have "discredited these hoary
beliefs.11

Sinn, 404 A. 2d at 678.

As one commentator has

observed:
The growing competence of medical science in the
field of psychic injuries has diminished the problems
of proof in mental distress cases. The development of
psychiatric tests and the refinement of diagnostic
techniques has led . . . authorities to conclude that
science can establish with reasonable medical certainty the existence and severity of psychic harm.
[Unfortunately] . . . changes in the law have not kept
pace with the increased sophistication of psychiatry.
Special rules created to deal with problems of proof
that were a legitimate concern in mental distress
cases 50 years ago have restricted modern courts in
their handling of these claims.
63 Geo. L.J. 1179, 1184-85 (1975).
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Thus,

,f

[t]here is no reason to believe that the causal

connection involved here is any more difficult for lawyers to
prove or for judges and jurors to comprehend than many others
which occur elsewhere in the law.11

Niederman v. Brodsky, 261

A.2d 84, 87 (Pa. 1970).
b.
Bystander recovery will not open the courthouse door to
fictitious injuries and fraudulent claims.
The anchor of the American system is that

M

[c]ourts must

depend upon the efficacy of the judicial processes to ferret out
the meritorious from the fraudulent."

Dillon, 441 P.2d at 918.

Any rule which seeks to bar fraud incidently by
withholding legal protection from all claims, just and
unjust, employs a medieval technique which, however
satisfying it may be defendants and defense attorneys,
is scarcely in keeping with the acknowledged function
of a modern legal system.
R. Leflar & L. Sanders, Mental Suffering and Its Consequences—
Arkansas Law, 7 U. Ark. L. Sch. Bull. 43, 60 (1939).
Thus, courts today uniformly reject fraud as a ground for
denying judicial relief.

"A contrary position would not only

exhibit a cynical lack of faith in the entire judicial system,
but would also penalize the honest because of the potential
activities of the dishonest."

Sinn, 404 A.2d at 679-80 n.ll.

c. The fear of a flood of similar litigation is an insufficient
reason to deny bystander recovery.
Historically, courts have assumed that permitting recovery
for negligently inflicted emotional distress would cause them to
"be swamped by an avalanche of cases."
A.2d 646, 647 (Pa. 1966).

Knaub v. Gotwaltf 220

This rationale is inherently delud28

ing, for "if the only purpose of our law was to unburden the
court

system,

achievement

then

simply

we
by

would

reach

closing

the

the

zenith

district

of

courts

judicial
to

all

litigants and allowing all wrongs to come to rest on innocent
victims.11

Gates, 719 P.2d at 197.

The Dillon court corrected this error by pointing out "that
courts are responsible for dealing with cases on their merits,
whether there be few suits or many; the existence of a multitude
of

claims

redress."
Prosser:

merely

shows

society's

441 P.2d at 917 n.3.

pressing

need

for

legal

In the words of Professor

"It is the business of law to remedy wrongs that

deserve it, even at the expense of a 'flood of litigation1; and
it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any
court of justice to deny relief upon the ground that it will
give the court too much work to do."
Infliction of Mental Suffering:

Prosser, Intentional

A New Tort, 37 Mich. L. Rev.

874, 877 (1939).
Although these statements are undeniably correct, it may
nevertheless be fortunate for the public fisc that the underlying assumption that courts would be swamped with cases has
proven to be misguided.

"[T]hose courts which have relaxed

their limitations on recovery of this type have not experienced
any substantial increase in litigation."
of Mental Distress:

Negligent Infliction

Reaction to Dillon v. Legg in California

and Other States, 25 Hastings L.J.
Professor Prosser noted:
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1248, 1250

(1974).

As

[T]he law is not for the protection of the physically
sound alone. It is the business of the courts to make
precedent where a wrong calls for redress, even if
lawsuits must be multiplied; and there has long been
precedent enough, and no great increase in litigation
has been observed.
Law of Torts § 54, at 360 (emphasis added).
d. Bystander recovery would not present a problem of unlimited
or unduly burdensome liability.
It has previously been explained that the Foreseeability
Rule properly limits the class of plaintiffs to those claimants
who fall within the scope of the modified factors listed in
Dillon.

Carefully applied, these factors reliably predict the

reasonably
conduct.

foreseeable

results

of

a

defendant's

negligent

In the words of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court:

In considering the wisdom of extending civil liability
for tortious conduct, courts have been inclined to
impose a duty where public policy demands that "as
between the tortfeasor who started the chain of
circumstances resulting in the injury and the entirely
innocent plaintiff, the tortfeasor should suffer the
consequences.ff
Sinn, 404 A.2d at 681 (quoting Comment, Bystander Recovery for
Mental Distress, 37 Fordham L. Rev. 429, 449 (1969)).
Thus, the argument becomes compelling

that

"[t]he more

complex and interwoven societal relations become the greater the
responsibility one must accept for his or her conduct."
A. 2d at 681.

404

It should be noted, however, that the fear of

unlimited liability can be tailored under the Foreseeability
Rule to allay the fears of those who face claims for negligently
inflicted emotional distress.

The Hawaii Supreme Court, for

example, has limited recovery under the Foreseeability Rule "to
30

claims of serious mental distress."

Leona v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d

758, 764 (Hawaii 1974) (emphasis added).
Certainly the law should not compensate for every
minor psychic shock incurred in the course of daily
living; it should not reinforce the neurotic patterns
of our society.
At some point, however, a person
threatened by severe mental injury should be able to
enforce his claim to reasonable psychological tranquillity.
D'Ambra, 338 A.2d at 529.
e,
It is possible to reasonably
liability.
This concern was dispelled

circumscribe

the area of

by the Pennsylvania

Supreme

Court:
We are confident that the application of the traditional tort concept of foreseeability will reasonably
circumscribe the tortfeasor's liability in such cases.
Foreseeability enters into the determination of
liability
in determining whether
the emotional
injuries sustained by the plaintiff were reasonably
foreseeable to the defendant.
Sinn, 404 A.2d at 684.
In this context, we are satisfied that the developments in the fields of medical science and psychiatry
do provide the impetus for expanding our legal
recognition of the consequences of the negligent act.
To arbitrarily refuse to recognize a now demonstrable
injury flowing from a negligent act would be wholly
indefensible.
Id. at 683.
The Foreseeability Rule fully embodies the notion that this
area of the law must be reasonably circumscribed, for liability
is only extended to the reasonably foreseeable results of a
defendant's negligent conduct.

The factors enumerated under the

Foreseeability Rule illustrate the perpetual evolution of the
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common law in its effort to keep abreast of change and progress.
This Court should utilize the opportunity presented by this
appeal

to

update

Utah's

approach

to

negligently

inflicted

emotional distress.

In this regard, the words of the Missouri

Supreme

it

Court

when

adopted

the

Foreseeability

Rule

are

persuasive:
A painstaking review of this whole subject has
convinced this court that the time has come for
Missouri to join the mainstream of Anglo-American
jurisprudence by abandoning the classic impact rule.
Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 772.
The Colorado Supreme Court has stated:

ff

[W]hile recogniz-

ing the importance of stare decisis to our system of jurisprudence, we note at the same time that the strength of the
common law has always been its responsiveness to the changing
needs of society."
The time has come for the dictum uttered in Jeppsen to be
studied, reformed, and modernized.
majority

approach

embodied

in

This Court should adopt the

the

Foreseeability

Rule

and

overrule the trail of dictum that began in Jeppsen and ended in
Reiser, for this dictum has evolved into an unprecedented rule
of law.

In the words of the Hawaii Supreme Court:

Blind adherence to legal rules constitutes an abrogation of the judicial function. Such blind adherence
may result as much from adoption of a rule without
adequate analysis as from application of a precedent
without examination of its claim to validity. Legal
rules should result from, rather than be a substitute
for, legal analysis. Judicial rumination of ideas in
the multitude of factual circumstances gives birth to
rules.
And continued rumination insures that such
rules will be applied only as long as they serve the
function for which they were designed.
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Columbia

Casualty

Co, v. Hoohuli, 437 P. 2d 99, 104

(Hawaii

1968).
This

Court

should

therefore

conclude

that

negligently

inflicted emotional distress is actionable in Utah under the
Foreseeability Rule.
CONCLUSION
The Foreseeability Rule is a logically sound and modern
approach, and should be adopted by this Court as the applicable
rule for granting relief to those who suffer severe emotional
injuries by reason of another's negligence.

Dicta in prior

decisions of this Court to the contrary should be overruled.
The trial court's judgment of dismissal should be reversed, and
this case remanded for trial.
DATED this 10th day of February, 1988.

JACKSON HOWARD,
TRED D. HOWARD, and
LESLIE W^ SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this
10th day of February, 1988.
Ray Phillips Ivie
IVIE & YOUNG
48 North University Ave.
P. 0. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603
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APPENDIX A

JACKSON HOWARD and
FRED D. HOWARD, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
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ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801)373-6345

OurTiTFNbT

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JESSE BROWN, by and through
his guardian ad litem,
JEFFERY BROWN,
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT

vs.

KEVIN K. LOH, JOSEPH PLUTA,
NORMAN LIWANAG, EUGENE LONG,
AND THOMAS M. FOLEY, d/b/a
THE KNIGHT BLOCK PARTNERSHIP,
a Hawaii General Partnership,
Defendants.

civil NO. CM ff7 3 7

COMES NOW the plaintiff and complains of the defendants and for cause of
action allege:
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Utah County, State of Utah.

2.

The plaintiff, Jeffery Brown is the father and guardian ad litem of

Jesse Brown, a minor child, and this is an action for damages pursuant to Rule 17
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
3.

Plaintiff

is without information as to the residents of the defen-

dants, Kevin K. Loh, Joseph Pluta, Norman Liwanag, Eugene Long and Thomas M. Foley,
d/b/a The Knight Block Partnership, a Hawaii General Partnership, but alleges that

its principal place of business is in Provo, Utah County, Utah; and that said
partnership does own and operate the property which gives rise to this lawsuit.
4.

On or about the 2nd day of August, 1986, the plaintiff, Jesse Brown

witnessed the injury and death of the decedent Jody Quinn who was killed in defendants' building referred to as the Knight Block, in an elevator shaft and by
mechanisms owned and controlled by the defendants.
5.

At all times herein mentioned said defendants were the owners and

operators of the Knight Block Building and the elevator therein contained.
6.

The defendants hereto failed to maintain and safeguard the said

elevator in a manner that would prevent its use by children at a time when it knew
that the elevator was defective and attractive to children.
7.

Said defendants knew or should have known that children were attracted

to the building in question; that they used the elevator for recreational purposes
and were naturally and inherently curious about its methods of operation.
8.

On August 2, 1986, Jody Quinn, in the company of his friend, plaintiff

Jesse Brown, were attracted to the elevator for recreational purposes and for a
period of approximately two hours rode the elevator up and down and became curious
about the manner in which the elevator operated mechanically.
9.

The nature of the operation of the elevator was such that a child

could satisfy his curiosity concerning the internal operation of the elevator by
wedging himself between the cage door and the access door to the elevator so as to
allow the elevator to proceed to another level while the child remained at the
floor level so as to be in the shaft itself after the elevator ascended.
2

10.

The defendant Knight Block knew or should have known that this was

possible and that a child could satisfy his curiosity regarding the operation of
the elevator in this manner but that to do so would expose the child to ultimate
risk.
11.

On the day in question the two boys did perform exactly that which

could have been foreseen by the defendants, such that in operating the elevator, the
decedent Jody Quinn became caught in between the two doors in such a way as to be
crushed by the elevator itself, resulting in his death; and all of which was
witnessed by the plaintiff, Jesse Brown, and which served to injure and traumatize
him, and cause severe emotional distress to him to his general and special damage.
12.

The defendants hereto were negligent in the manner in which they

maintained, operated, guarded and cared for the said elevator and in their failure
to warn users of the potential risks and hazards inherent in its operation.
13.

By reason of the negligence of the defendants, the plaintiff

has

sustained great pain and suffering; and has incurred hospital and medical expenses,
the exact amount of which is unknown at this time, but for which plaintiff shall be
entitled to recover upon proof.
14.

The plaintiff

has sustained general damages, the exact amount of

which is unknown at this time, but for which the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon proof.
15.

The plaintiff

is entitled to interest pursuant to statute upon all

special damages incurred from the date of injury.
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RAY PHILLIPS IVIE, #3657
IVIE & YODNG

Attorneys for Defendants
48 North University Avenue
P. 0. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603
375-3000
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JESSE BROWN, by and through
his guardian ad litem,
JEFFERY BROWN,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
KEVIN K. LOH, JOSEPH PLUTA,
NORMAN LIWANAG, EUGENE LONG,
and THOMAS M. FOLEY, d/b/a
THE KNIGHT BLOCK PARTNERSHIP,
a Hawaii General Partnership,
Defendants.

Civil No. CV-87-37
Judge Park

The above-entitled matter came on regularly and duly
for hearing before the above-entitled court on the 28th day of
August, 1987, on defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Attorney Fred
D. Howard appeared as counsel for plaintiff.

Attorney Ray

Phillips Ivie appeared as counsel for defendants.
The matter having been submitted to the Court upon
written briefs and oral argument and the Court now being fully
advised in the matter, makes and enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
Plaintiff brings this action against defendants to
recover for negligently inflicting emotional injury.
The Court having found as above set forth, now makes
and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A cause of action for emotional distress may not be
based upon mere negligence.

See Reiser v. Lohner 641 P.2d 93.

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
dismissing plaintiff's action with prejudice.
/O

DATED AND SIGNED this

day of September, 1987.

BY THE COURT:

BOYD'L. PARK, Judge

-2-

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
with postage prepaid thereon, this

/

sr

day of September,

1987, to:
Jackson Howard, Esq.
Fred Howard, Esq.
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
P. 0. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603

/

\\h ktfQJQ

Secretary
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RAY PHILLIPS IVIE, #3657
IVIE & YOUNG
Attorneys for Defendants
48 North University Avenue
P. 0. Box 672
Provo, Utah 84603
375-3000
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JESSE BROWN# by and through
his guardian ad litem,
JEFFERY BROWN,

JUDGMENT J

Plaintiff,
vs.
KEVIN K. LOHf JOSEPH PLUTA,
NORMAN LIWANAG, EUGENE LONG,
and THOMAS M. FOLEY, d/b/a
THE KNIGHT BLOCK PARTNERSHIP,
a Hawaii General Partnership,
Defendants.

Civil No. CV-87-37
Judge Park

The Court having heretofor made and entered Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the
following:
JUDGMENT
Defendants are hereby awarded judgment against
plaintiff as a matter of law, no cause for action.

Plaintiff's

Complaint on file herein is dismissed with prejudice.

/P

DATED AND SIGNED this

day of September, 1987,

BY THE COURT:

Vi

rf^<r^

BOYD X. PARK / Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Judgment with postage prepaid
thereon, this

/

day of September, 1987, to:

Jackson Howard, Esq.
Fred Howard, Esq.
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
P. 0. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603

Secretary
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